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Abstract. In this paper, we provide a necessary clarification of the good
security properties that can be obtained from parallel implementations
of masking schemes. For this purpose, we first argue that (i) the probing
model is not straightforward to interpret, since it more naturally cap-
tures the intuitions of serial implementations, and (ii) the noisy leakage
model is not always convenient, e.g. when combined with formal methods
for the verification of cryptographic implementations. Therefore we intro-
duce a new model, the bounded moment model, that formalizes a weaker
notion of security order frequently used in the side-channel literature. In-
terestingly, we prove that probing security for a serial implementation
implies bounded moment security for its parallel counterpart. This re-
sult therefore enables an accurate understanding of the links between
formal security analyses of masking schemes and experimental security
evaluations based on the estimation of statistical moments Besides its
consolidating nature, our work also brings useful technical contributions.
First, we describe and analyze refreshing and multiplication algorithms
that are well suited for parallel implementations and improve security
against multivariate side-channel attacks. Second, we show that simple
refreshing algorithms (with linear complexity) that are not secure in the
continuous probing model are secure in the continuous bounded moment
model. Eventually, we discuss the independent leakage assumption re-
quired for masking to deliver its security promises, and its specificities
related to the serial or parallel nature of an implementation.
1 Introduction
The masking countermeasure is currently the most investigated solution to im-
prove security against power-analysis attacks [?]. It has been analyzed theo-
retically in the so-called probing and noisy leakage models [?,?], and based
on a large number of case studies, with various statistical tools (e.g. [?,?] for
non-profiled and profiled attacks, respectively). Very briefly summarized, state-
of-the-art masking schemes are currently divided in two main trends: on the
one hand, software-oriented masking, following the initial work of Prouff and
Rivain [?]; on the other hand hardware-oriented masking (or threshold imple-
mentations) following the inital work of Nikova, Rijmen and Schläffer [?].
At CRYPTO 2015, Reparaz et al. highlighted interesting connections between
the circuit constructions in these two lines of works [?]. Looking at these links,
a concrete difference remains between software- and hardware-oriented masking
schemes. Namely, the (analyses of the) first ones usually assume a serial manip-
ulation of the shares while the (implementations of the) second ones encourage
their parallel manipulation.1 Unfortunately, the probing leakage model, that has
led to an accurate understanding of the security guarantees of software-oriented
masking schemes [?], is not directly interpretable in the parallel setting. Intu-
itively, this is because the parallel manipulation of the shares reveals information
on all of them, e.g. via their sum, but observing sums of wires is not permitted
in the probing model. As will be clear in the following, this does not limit the
concrete relevance of the probing model. Yet, it reveals a gap between the level
of theoretical understanding of serial and parallel masked implementations.
1.1 Our contribution
Starting from the observation that parallelism is a key difference between soft-
ware and hardware-oriented masking, we introduce a new model – the bounded
moment model – that allows rigorous reasoning and efficient analyses of paral-
lel masked implementations. In summary, the bounded moment model can be
seen as the formal counterpart to the notion of security against higher-order
attacks [?,?], just as the noisy leakage model [?] is the formal counterpart to
information theoretic leakage metrics such as introduced in [?]. It allows us to
extend the consolidating work of [?] and to obtain the following results:
– First, we exhibit a natural connection between the probing model and the
bounded moment model. More precisely, we prove that security in the prob-
ing model for a serial implementation implies security in the bounded mo-
ment model for the corresponding parallel implementation.
– Next, we propose regular refreshing and multiplication algorithms suitable
for parallel implementations. Thanks to parallelism, these algorithms can be
implemented in linear time, with the same memory requirements as a serial
implementation (since masking requires to store all the shares anyway). Note
that the refreshing algorithm is particularly appealing for combination with
key-homomorphic primitives (e.g. inner product based [?]), since it allows
them to be masked with linear (time and randomness) complexity. As for
the multiplication algorithm, its linear execution time also provides improved
security against multivariate (aka horizontal) side-channel attacks [?].
– Third, we exhibit the concrete separation between the probing model and the
bounded moment model. For this purpose, we provide simple examples from
the literature on leakage squeezing and low-entropy masking schemes show-
ing that (for linear leakage funtions) it is possible to have a larger security
1 This division between hardware and software is admittedly oversimplifying in view
of the improved capabilities of modern microprocessors to take advantage of paral-
lelism. So the following results in fact also apply to parallel software computing.
order in the bounded moment model than in the probing model [?,?]. More
importantly, we show that our simple refreshing algorithm is insecure in the
probing model against adversaries taking advantage of continuous leakage,
while it remains secure against such (practically relevant) adversaries in the
bounded moment model. This brings a theoretical foundation to the useful
observation that simple refreshing schemes that are sometimes considered
in practice (e.g. adding shares that sum to zero) do not lead to devastating
attacks when used to refresh an immutable secret state (e.g. a block cipher
key), despite their lack of security in the continuous probing model. Note
that the latter result is also of interest for serial implementations.
– Finally, we illustrate our results with selected case studies, and take ad-
vantage of them to discuss the assumption of independent leakages in side-
channel attacks (together with its underlying physical intuitions).
1.2 Related work
Serial masking and formal methods. The conceptual simplicity of the prob-
ing model makes it an attractive target for automated verification. Recognizing
the close similarities between information-flow policies and security in the prob-
ing model, Moss, Oswald, Page and Turnstall [?] build a masking compiler that
takes as input an unprotected program and outputs an equivalent program that
resists first-order DPA. Their compiler performs a type-based analysis of the in-
put program and iteratively transforms the program when encountering a typing
error. Aiming for increased generality, Bayrak, Regazzoni, Novo and Ienne [?]
propose a SMT-based method for analyzing statistical independence between
secret inputs and intermediate computations, still in the context of first-order
DPA. In a series of papers starting with [?], Eldib, Wang and Schaumont develop
more powerful SMT-based methods for synthesizing masked implementations or
analyzing the security of existing masked implementations. Their approach is
based on a logical characterization of security at arbitrary orders in the prob-
ing model. In order to avoid the “state explosion” problem, which results from
looking at higher-orders and from the logical encoding of security in the probing
model, they exploit elaborate methods that support incremental verification,
even for relatively small orders. A follow-up by Eldib and Wang [?] extends
this idea to synthesize masked implementations fully automatically. Leverag-
ing the connection between probabilistic information flow policies and relational
program logics, Barthe, Beläıd, Dupressoir, Fouque, Grégoire and Strub [?] in-
troduce another approach based on a domain-specific logic for proving security
in the probing model. Like Eldib, Wang and Schaumont, their method applies to
higher orders. Interestingly, it achieves practicality at orders up to four for mul-
tiplications and S-boxes. In a complementary line of work, Beläıd, Benhamouda,
Passelegue, Prouff, Thillard and Vergnaud [?] develop an automated tool for
finding probing attacks on implementations and use it to discover optimal (in
randomness complexity) implementations of multiplication at order 2, 3, and 4
(with 2, 4, and 5 random bits). They also propose a multiplication for arbitrary
orders, requiring d
2
4 + d bits of randomness to achieve security at order d.
All these works focus on the usual definition of security in the probing
model. In contrast, Barthe, Beläıd, Dupressoir, Fouque and Grégoire introduce
a stronger notion of security, called strong non-interference (or SNI), which en-
ables compositional verification of higher-order masking schemes [?], and leads
to much improved capabilities to analyze large circuits (i.e. full algorithms, typ-
ically). Similar to several other security notions for the probing model, strong
non-interference is qualitative, in the sense that a program is either secure or in-
secure. Leaving the realm of qualitative notions, Eldib, Wang, Taha, and Schau-
mont [?] consider a quantitative relaxation of the usual definition of (probing)
security, and adapt their tools to measure the quantitative masking strength of
an implementation. Their definition is specialized to first-order moments, but
the connections with the bounded moment model are evident, and it would be
interesting to explore generalizations of their work to our new model.
Threshold and parallel implementations. The inital motivation of Nikova,
Rijmen and Schläffer was the observation that secure implementations of mask-
ing in hardware are challenging, due to the risk of glitches recombining the
shares [?]. Their main idea to prevent this issue is to add a condition of non-
completeness to the masked computations (i.e. ensure that any combinatorial
circuit never takes all shares as input). Many different works have confirmed the
practical relevance of this additional requirement, making it the de facto stan-
dard for hardware masking (see [?,?,?,?,?] for a few examples). Our following
results are particularly relevant to threshold implementations since (i) in view
of their hardware specialization, they encourage a parallel manipulation of the
shares, (ii) most of their security evaluations so far were based on the estimation
of statistical moments that we formalize with the bounded moment model, and
(iii) their higher-order implementations suggested in [?] and recently analyzed
in [?] exploit the simple refreshing scheme that we study in Section 8.2.
Noisy leakage model. Note that the noisy leakage model in [?] also provides a
natural way to capture parallel implementations (and in fact a more general one:
see Figure 7 in conclusions). Yet, this model is not always convenient when ex-
ploiting the aforementioned formal methods. Indeed, these tools benefit greatly
from the simplicity of the probing model in order to analyze complex implemen-
tations, and hardly allow the manipulation of noisy leakages. In this respect,
the bounded moment model can be seen as a useful intermediate (i.e. bounded
moment security can be efficiently verified with formal methods, although its
verification naturally remains slower than probing security).
Eventually, we believe it is fundamentally interesting to clarify the connec-
tions between the mainstream (probing and) noisy leakage model(s) and con-
crete evaluation strategies based on the estimation of statistical moments. In
this respect, it is the fact that bounded moment security requires a weaker in-
dependence condition than probing security that enables us to prove the simple
refreshing of Section 8.2, which is particularly useful in practice, especially com-
pared to previous solutions for efficient refreshing algorithms such as [?]. Here
as well, directly dealing with noisy leakages would be more complex.
2 Background
In this section, we introduce our leakage setting for serial and parallel imple-
mentations. Note that for readability, we keep the description of our serial and
parallel computing models informal, and defer their definition to Section 5.
2.1 Serial implementations
We start from the description of leakage traces in [?], where y is a n-bit sensitive
value manipulated by a leaking device. Typically, it could be the output of an
S-box computation such that y = S(x ⊕ k) with n-bit plaintext and key words
x and k. Let y1, y2, . . . , yd be the d shares representing y in a Boolean masking
scheme (i.e. y = y1 ⊕ y2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ yd). In a side-channel attack, the adversary
is provided with some information (or leakage) on each share. Concretely, the
type of information provided highly depends on the type of implementation
considered. For example, in a serial implementation, we typically have that each
share is manipulated during a different “cycle” c so that the number of cycles in
the implementation equals the number of shares, as in Figure 1(a). The leakage
in each cycle then takes the form of a random variable Lc that is the output of
a leakage function Lc, which takes yc and a noise variable Rc as arguments:
Lc = Lc(yc,Rc) , with 1 ≤ c ≤ d . (1)
That is, each subtrace Lc is a vector, the elements of which represent time
samples. When accessing a single sample τ , we use the notation Lτc = L
τ
c (yc,Rc).
From this general setup, a number of assumptions are frequently used in the
literature on side-channel cryptanalysis. We consider the following two (also
considered in [?]). First, we assume that the leakage vectors Lc are independent
random variables. This a strict requirement for masking proofs to hold and
will be specifically discussed in Section 9. Second, and for convenience only, we
assume that the leakage functions are made of a deterministic part Gc(yc) and
additive noiseRc so that Lc = Lc(yc,Rc) ≈ Gc(yc)+Rc. Note that the + symbol
here denotes the addition in R (while ⊕ denotes a bitwise XOR).
2.2 Parallel implementations
We now generalize the previous serial implementation to the parallel setting. In
this case, the main difference is that several shares can be manipulated in the
same cycle. For example, the right part of Figure 1 shows the leakage correspond-
ing to a fully parallel implementation where all the shares are manipulated in a
single cycle. As a result, we have a single leakage vectorL1 = L(y1, y2 . . . , yd,R1).
More generally, we will consider N -cycle parallel implementations such that for
each cycle c (1 ≤ c ≤ N), we define the set of shares that are manipulated during
the cycle as Yc, and the number of shares in a set Yc as nc. This means that
a masked implementation requires at least that the union of these sets equals
{y1, y2, . . . , yd}, i.e. all the shares need to be manipulated at least once. This
Fig. 1. Leakage trace of d-shared secret.
model of computation is a generalization of the previous one since the serial im-
plementation in the left part of the figure is simply captured with the case N = d
and, for every c, nc = 1. As previously mentioned, the highly parallel implemen-
tation in the right part of the figure is captured with the case N = 1 and n1 = d.
For simplicity, we refer to this case as the parallel implementation case in the
following. Any intermediate solution mixing serial and parallel computing (e.g.
2 shares per cycle, 3 shares per cycle, . . . ) can be captured by our model. Con-
cretely, the impact of parallel computation is reflected both by a reduced number
of cycles and by an increased instantaneous power consumption, illustrated with
the higher amplitude of the curves in Figure 1(b). A simple abstraction to reflect
this larger power consumption is the following linear model:
Lc = α
1
c · G1c (Yc(1)) + α2c · G2c (Yc(2)) + . . .+ αncc · Gncc (Yc(nc)) +Rc. (2)
with all αjc’s ∈ R. Contrary to the additive noise assumption that is only used
for convenience and not needed for masking proofs, this linear model is a crit-
ical ingredient of our analysis of parallel implementations, since it is needed to
maintain the independent leakage assumption. As for other physical issues that
could break this assumption, we assume Equation (2) holds in the next sections
and discuss its possible limitations in Section 9. Yet, we already note that a
general contradiction of this hypothesis would imply that any (e.g. threshold)
implementation manipulating its shares in parallel should be insecure.
3 Security models
3.1 Probing security and noisy leakage
We first recall two important models for analyzing masking countermeasures.
First, the conceptually simple t-probing and ε-probing (or random probing)
models were introduced in [?]. In the former, the adversary obtains t intermediate
values of the computation (e.g. can probe t wires if we compute in binary fields).
In the latter, he rather obtains each of these intermediate values with probability
ε, and gets ⊥ with probability 1 − ε (where ⊥ means no knowledge). Using a
Chernoff-bound, it is easy to show that security in the t-probing model reduces
to security in the ε-probing model for certain values of ε.
Second, the noisy leakage model describes many realistic side-channel attacks
where an adversary obtains each intermediate value perturbed with a “δ-noisy”
leakage function [?]. A leakage function L is called δ-noisy if for a uniformly
random variable Y we have SD(Y ;Y |LY ) ≤ δ, with SD the statistical distance.
It was shown in [?] that an equivalent condition is that the leakage is not too
informative, where informativity is measured with the standard notion of mutual
information MI(Y ;LY ). In contrast with the ε-probing model, the adversary
obtains noisy leakage for each intermediate variable. For example, in the context
of masking, he obtains L(Yi,Ri) for all the shares Yi, which is reflective of actual
implementations where the adversary can potentially observe the leakage of all
these shares, since they are all present in leakage traces (as in Figure 1).
Recently, Duc et al. showed that security against probing attacks implies
security against noisy leakages [?]. This result leads to the natural strategy of
proving security in the (simpler) probing model while stating security levels
based on the concrete information leakage evaluations (as discussed in [?]).
3.2 The bounded moment model
Motivation. In practice, the probing model is perfectly suited to proving the
security of the serial implementations from Section 2.1. This is because it ensures
that an adversary needs to observe d shares with his probes to recover secret
information. Since in a serial implementation, every share is manipulated in a
different clock cycle, it leads to a simple analogy between the number of probes
and the number of cycles exploited in the leakage traces. By contrast, this simple
analogy no longer holds for parallel implementations, where all the shares ma-
nipulated during a given cycle can leak concurrently. Typically, assuming that
an adversary can only observe a single share with each probe is counter-intuitive
in this case. For example, it would be natural to allow that he can observe the
output of Equation (2) with one probe, which corresponds to a single cycle in
Figure 1(b) and already contains information about all the shares (if nc = d).
As mentioned in introduction, the noisy leakage model provides a natural
solution to deal with the leakages of parallel implementations. Indeed, nothing
prevents the output of Equation (2) from leaking only a limited amount of in-
formation if a large enough noise is considered. Yet, directly dealing with noisy
leakages is sometimes inconvenient for the analysis of masked implementations,
e.g. when it comes to verification with the formal methods listed in Section 1.2.
In view of their increasing popularity in embedded security evaluation, this cre-
ates a strong incentive to come up with an alternative model allowing both the
construction of proofs for parallel implementations and their efficient evaluation
with formal methods. Interestingly, we will show in Section 5 that security in
this alternative model is implied by probing security. It confirms the relevance of
the aforementioned strategy of first proving security in the probing model, and
then stating security levels based on concrete information leakage evaluations.
Fig. 2. Leakage distributions of a single-bit 2-shared secret.
Definition. Intuitively, the main limitation of the noisy leakage model in the
context of formal methods is that it involves the (expensive) manipulation of
complete leakage distributions. In this respect, one natural simplification that
fits to a definition of “order” used in the practical side-channel literature is to
relate security to the smallest key-dependent statistical moment in the leakage
distributions. Concretely, the rationale behind this definition is that the security
of a masked implementation comes from the need to estimate higher-order sta-
tistical moments, a task that becomes exponentially difficult in the number of
shares if their leakages are independent and sufficiently noisy (see the discussion
in [?]). Interestingly, such a definition directly captures the parallel implementa-
tion setting, as can easily be illustrated with an example. Say we have a single-bit
sensitive value Y that is split in d = 2 shares, and that an adversary is able to
observe a leakage function where the deterministic part is the Hamming weight
function and the noise is normally distributed. Then, the (bivariate) leakage
distribution for a serial implementation, where the adversary can observe the
leakage of the two shares separately, is shown in the upper part of Figure 2. And
the (univariate) leakage distribution for a parallel implementation, where the
adversary can only observe the sum of the leakages of the two shares, is shown
in the lower part of the figure. In both cases, the first-order moment (i.e. the
mean) of the leakage distributions is independent of Y .
In order to define our security model, we therefore need the following definition.
Definition 1 (Mixed moment at orders o1, o2, . . . , or). Let {Xi}ri=1 be a set
of r random variables. The mixed moment at orders o1, o2, . . . , or of {Xi}ri=1 is:
E(Xo11 ×X
o2
2 × . . .×Xorr ),
where E denotes the expectation operator and × denotes the multiplication in
R. For simplicity, we denote the integer o =
∑
i oi as the order of this mixed
moment. We further say that a mixed moment at order o is m-variate (or has
dimension m) if there are exactly m non-zero coefficients oi.
This directly leads to our defintion of security in the bounded moment model.
Definition 2 (Security in the bounded moment model). Let {Lc}Nc=1 be
the leakage vectors corresponding to an N -cycle cryptographic implementation
manipulating a secret variable Y . This implementation is secure at order o if all
the mixed moments of order up to o of {Lc}Nc=1 are independent of Y .2
Say for example that we have a sensitive value Y that is split in d = 3 shares, for
which we leak the same noisy Hamming weights as in Figure 2. In the case of a
(fully) parallel implementation, we have only one leakage sample L1 and security
at order 2 requires that E(L1) and E(L
2
1) are independent of Y . In the case of
a serial implementation, we have three samples L1, L2, L3 and must show that
E(L1), E(L2), E(L3), E(L
2
1), E(L
2
2), E(L
2
3), E(L1×L2), E(L1×L3) and E(L2×L3)
are independent of Y . Note that the only difference between this example and
concrete implementations is that in the latter case, each cycle would correspond
to a leakage vector Lc rather than a single (univariate) sample Lc.
Note also that this definition allows us to clarify a long standing discussion
within the cryptographic hardware community about the right definition of se-
curity order. That is, the first definitions for secure masking (namely “perfect
masking at order o” in [?] and “masking at order o” in [?]) where specialized
to serial implementations, and required that any tuple of o intermediate vari-
ables is independent of any sensitive variable in an implementation. For clarity,
we will now call this (strong) independence condition “security at order o in the
probing model”. However, due to its specialization to serial implementation, this
definition also leaves a confusion about whether its generalization to parallel im-
plementations should relate to the smallest dimensionality of a key-dependent
leakage distribution (i.e. m in our definition) or the smallest order of a key-
dependent moment in these distributions (i.e. o in our definition). Concretely,
m ≥ o in the case of a serial implementation, but only the second solution
generalizes to parallel implementations, since for such implementations the di-
mensionality can be as low as 1 independent of the number of shares. Hence, we
adopt this solution in the rest of the paper and will call this (weaker) indepen-
dence condition “security at order o in the bounded moment model”.
2 This definition justifies why we use raw moments rather than central or standardized
ones. Indeed, to establish security at order o, we require moments of orders less than
o to be independent of Y . Thus centralization (i.e. removing the mean) or normal-
ization by the standard deviation only add terms known to be independent of Y .
4 Additional features and discussions
4.1 Experimental model validation
Quite naturally, the introduction of a new leakage model should come with em-
pirical validation that it reasonably matches the peculiarities of actual imple-
mentations and their evaluation. Conveniently, in the case of the bounded mo-
ment model, we do nothing else than formalizing evaluation approaches that are
already deployed in the literature. This is witnessed by attacks based on the es-
timation of statistical moments, e.g. exploiting the popular difference-of-means
and correlation distinguishers [?,?,?]. Such tools have been applied to various
protected implementations, including threshold ones [?,?,?,?] and other masking
schemes or designs running in recent high-frequency devices [?,?,?]. In all these
cases, security at order o was claimed if the lowest key-dependent statistical
moment of the leakage distribution was found to be of order o+ 1.
4.2 Dimensionality reduction
One important property of Definition 2 is that it captures security based on
the statistical order of the key-dependent moments of a leakage distribution.
This means that the dimensionality of the leakage vectors does not affect the
security order in the bounded moment model. Therefore, it also implies that
such a security definition is not affected by linear dimensionality reductions.
This simple observation is formalized by the following definition and lemma.
Definition 3 (Linear dimensionality reduction). Let L = [L1, L2, . . . , LM ]
denote an M -sample leakage vector and {αi}mi=1 denote M -element vectors in
R. We say that L′ = [L′1, L
′
2, . . . , L
′
m] is a linearly reduced leakage vector if each
of its (projected) samples L′i is corresponds to a scalar product 〈L;αi〉.
Lemma 1. Let {Lc}Nc=1 be the leakage vectors corresponding to an N -cycle
cryptographic implementation manipulating a secret variable Y . If this imple-
mentation is secure at order o in the bounded moment model, then any imple-
mentation with linearly reduced leakages of {Lc}Nc=1 is secure at order o.
Proof. Since the samples of L′ are linear combinations of the samples of L, we
need the expectation of any polynomial of degree up to o of the samples of L′ to
be independent of Y . This directly derives from Definition 2 which guarantees
that the expectation of any monomial of degree up to o is independent of Y . ut
Typical examples of linear dimensionality reductions are PCA [?] and LDA [?].
Note that while linearly combining leakage samples does not affect bounded
moment security, it can be used to reduce the noise of the samples implied in
a higher-order moment computation, and therefore can impact security in the
noisy leakage model. This is in fact exactly the goal of the bounded moment
model. Namely, it aims at simplifying security evaluations by splitting the tasks
of evaluating the leakages’ deterministic part (captured by their moments) and
probabilistic part (aka noise). Concrete security against side-channel attacks is
ensured by two ingredients: a high security order and sufficient noise.
4.3 Abstract implementation settings
In the following, we exploit our model in order to study the impact of parallelism
in general terms. For this purpose, we follow the usual description of masked im-
plementations as a sequence of leaking operations. Furthermore, and in order to
first abstract away physical specificities, we consider so-called (noiseless) “ab-
stract implementations”, simplifying Equation (2) into:
Lc = α1 · G1 (Yc(1)) + α2 · G2 (Yc(2)) + . . .+ αnc · Gnc (Yc(nc)) . (3)
Such simplifications allow analyzing masked implementations independent of
their concrete instantiation in order to detect algorithmic flaws. Note that having
Rc 6= 0 cannot change conclusions regarding the security order of an implemen-
tation (in the bounded moment model), which is the only metric we consider
in this paper. Indeed, this order only depends on the smallest key-dependent
moment of the leakage distribution, which is independent of the additive noise.
By contrast, the variance of Rc affects the concrete information leakage of an im-
plementation. We recall that algorithmically sound masked implementations do
not mandatorily lead to physically secure implementations (e.g. because of the
independence issues discussed in Section 9 or a too low noise). Yet, and as men-
tioned in Section 3.2, testing the security of abstract implementations of masking
schemes (in the probing or bounded moment models) is a useful preliminary, be-
fore performing expensive evaluations of concrete implementations.
5 Serial security implies parallel security
We now provide our first result in the bounded moment model. Namely, we
establish an intuitive reduction between security of parallel implementations in
the bounded moment model and security of serial implementations in the probing
model. For this purpose, we also formalize our serial and parallel computation
models. One useful and practical consequence of the reduction is that one can
adapt existing tools for proving security in the bounded moment model, either
by implementing a program transformation that turns parallel implementations
into serial ones, or by adapting these tools to parallel implementations.
Intuition. In order to provide some intuition for the reduction, recall that the
leakage samples of an abstract parallel implementation are of the form:
Lc = Zc(1) + Zc(2) + . . .+ Zc(nc),
with Zc(i) = αi · Gi(Zc(i)), and that the bounded moments are of the form:
E(Lo11 × L
o2
2 × . . .× Lorr ).
Therefore, by linearity of the expectation, mixed moments at order d are inde-
pendent of secrets provided all quantities of the form:
E ((Z1(1))o1,1 × . . .× (Z1(n1))o1,n1 × (Zr(1))or,1 × . . .× (Zr(nr))or,nr ) , (4)
are independent of secrets, for all o1,1, . . . or,nr whose sum is bounded by o. Note
that there are at most o pairs (i, j) such that oi,j 6= 0. Let (i1, n1) . . . (ik, nk)
with k ≤ o be an enumeration of these pairs. Therefore, in order to establish that
Equation (4) is independent of the secrets, it is sufficient to show that the tuple
〈Zi1(n1), . . . ,Zik(nk)〉 is independent of these secrets. This in fact corresponds
exactly to proving security in the probing model at order o.
Formalization. The theoretical setting for formalizing the reduction is a simple
parallel programming language in which programs are sequences of basic instruc-
tions (note that adding for loops poses no further difficulty). A basic instruction
is either a parallel assignment:
〈a1, . . . , an〉 := 〈e1, . . . , en〉,
where e1, . . . , en are expressions built from variables, constants, and operators,
or a parallel sampling:
〈a1, . . . , an〉 ← 〈µ1, . . . , µn〉,
where µ1, . . . , µn are distributions. Despite its simplicity, this formalism is suf-
ficient to analyse notions used for reasoning about threshold implementations,
for instance non-completeness. More importantly, one can also define the notion
of leakage associated to the execution of a program. Formally, an execution of
a program c of length ` is a sequence of states s0 . . . s`, where s0 is the initial
state and the state si+1 is obtained from the state si as follows:
– If the ith-instruction is a parallel assignment, 〈a1, . . . , an〉 := 〈e1, . . . , en〉 by
evaluating the expressions e1 . . . en in state si, leading to values v1 . . . vn,
and updating state si by assigning values v1 . . . vn to variables a1 . . . an;
– if the ith-instruction is a parallel sampling, 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ← 〈µ1, . . . , µn〉 by
sampling values v1 . . . vn from distributions µ1 . . . µn, and updating the state
si by assigning the values v1 . . . vn to the variables a1 . . . an.
By assigning to each execution a probability (formally, this is the product of
the probabilities of each random sampling), one obtains for every program c
of length ` a sequence of distributions over states σ0σ1 . . . σ`, where σ0 is the
distribution 1s0 . The leakage of a program is then a sequence L1 . . . L`, defined
by computing for each i the sum of the values held by the variables assigned by
the ith instruction, that is a1 + . . .+ an for parallel assignments (or samplings).
The mixed moments at order o then simply follow Definition 1. As for the serial
programming language, instructions are either assignments a := e or sampling
a ← µ. The semantics of a program are defined similarly to the parallel case.
Order o security of a serial program in the probing model amounts to show that
each o-tuple of intermediate values is independent of the secret.
Without loss of generality, we can assume that parallel programs are written
in static single assignment form, meaning that variables: (i) appear on the left
hand side of an assignment or a sampling only once in the text of a program;
(ii) are defined before use (i.e. they occur on the left of an assignment or a
sampling before they are used on the right of an assignment); (iii) do not occur
simultaneously on the left and right hand sides of an assignment. Under such
assumption, any serialization that transforms parallel assignments or parallel
samplings into sequences of assignments or samplings preserve the semantics
of programs. For instance, the left to right serialization transforms the parallel
instructions 〈a1, . . . , an〉 := 〈e1, . . . , en〉 and 〈a1, . . . , an〉 ← 〈µ1, . . . , µn〉 into
a1 := e1; . . . ; an := en and a1 ← µ1; . . . ; an ← µn respectively.
Reduction theorem. We can now state the reduction formally:
Theorem 1. A parallel implementation is secure at order o in the bounded mo-
ment model if its serialization is secure at order o in the probing model.
Proof. Assume that a parallel implementation is insecure in the bounded mo-
ment model but its serialization is secure in the probing model. Therefore, there
exists a mixed moment:
E(Lo11 × L
o2
2 × . . .× Lorr ),
that is dependent of the secrets. By definition of leakage vector, and properties of
expectation, there exist program variables a1, . . . , ak, with k ≤ o, and o′1, . . . , o′k
with
∑
i oi ≤ o such that:
E(a
o′1
1 × a
o′2
2 × . . .× a
ok
k )
is dependent of secrets, contradicting the fact (due to security of serialization in
the probing model) that the tuple 〈a1, . . . , ak〉 is independent of secrets. ut
Note that concretely, this theorem suggests the possibility of efficient “combined
security evaluations”, starting with the use the formal verification tools to test
probing security, and following with additional tests in the (weaker) bounded
moment model in case of negative results (see the examples in Section 8).
Interestingly, it also backs up a result already used in [?] (Theorem 1), where
the parallel nature of the implementations was not specifically discussed but
typically corresponds to the experimental case study in this paper.
6 Parallel algorithms
In this section, we describe regular and parallelizable algorithms for secure (ad-
ditively) masked computations. For this purpose, we denote a vector of d shares
as a = [a1, a2, . . . , ad], the rotation of this vector by q positions as rot(a, q), and
the bitwise addition (XOR) and multiplication (AND) operations between two
vectors as a⊕ b and a · b. For concreteness, our analyses focus on computations
in GF(2), but their generalization to larger fields is straightforward.
6.1 Parallel refreshing
As a starting point, we exhibit a very simple refreshing algorithm that has con-
stant time in the parallel implementation setting and only requires d bits of fresh
uniform randomness. This refreshing is given in Algorithm 1 and an example of
abstract implementation for d = 3 shares is in Figure 3, where we mark the load-
Algorithm 1 Parallel refreshing algorithm.
Input: Shares a satisfying
⊕
i ai = a, uniformly random vector r.
Output: Refreshed shares b satisfying
⊕
i bi = a.
b = a⊕ r ⊕ rot(r, 1);
return b.
ing of input shares in gray, the loading and rotation of fresh randomness in green
and the additions with this fresh randomness in blue. Such an implementation
runs in 5 cycles (independent of d) and leads to 4 observable leakages (since the
leakage of the random vector r and its rotation gives rise to the same sum).
Fig. 3. Abstract implementation of a 3-share refreshing.
6.2 Parallel multiplication
Next, we consider the more challenging case of parallel multiplication with the
similar goal of producing a simple and systematic way to manipulate the shares
and fresh randomness used in the masked computations. For this purpose, our
starting observation is that existing secure (serial) multiplications such as [?]
(that we will mimic) essentially work in two steps: first a product phase that
computes a d2-element matrix containing the pairwise multiplications of all the
shares, second a compressing phase that reduces this d2-element matrix to a d-
element one (using fresh randomness). As a result, and given the share vectors a
and b of two sensitive values a and b, it is at least possible to perform each pair
of cross products ai · bj ’s and aj · bi’s with XOR and rotation operations, and
without refreshing. By contrast, the direct products ai·bj have to be separated by
fresh randomness (since otherwise it could lead to the manipulation of sensitive
values during the compression phase, e.g. (ai · bi) ⊕ (ai · bj) = ai · (bi ⊕ bj). A
similar reasoning holds with the uniform randomness used between the XORs
of the compression phase. Namely, every fresh vector can be used twice (in its
original form and rotated by one) without leaking additional information.
This rationale suggests a simple multiplication algorithm that has linear time
complexity in the parallel implementation setting and requires
⌈
d−1
4
⌉
random
vectors of d bits (it can be viewed as an adaptation of the algorithms in [?]). We
first highlight it based on its abstract implementation in Figure 4, which starts
with the loading and rotation of the input shares (gray cycles), then performs
the product phase (red cycles) and finally compresses its output by combining
the addition of fresh randomness (blue cycles) and accumulation (orange cycles).
In general, such an implementation runs in < 5d cycles for d shares, with slight
variations depending on the value of d. For d mod 4 = 3 (as in Figure 4) it is
“complete” (i.e. ends with two accumulation cycles and one refreshing). But for
d mod 4 = 0 it ends with a single accumulation cycle, for d mod 4 = 1 it ends
with two accumulation cycles and for d mod 4 = 2 it ends with an accumulation
cycle and a refrehing. An accurate description is given in Algorithm 3.
Fig. 4. Abstract implementation of a 3-share multiplication.
Impact for multivariate (aka horizontal) attacks. In simplified (asymp-
totic) terms, the security proofs for masked implementations in [?] state that
the success rate of a side-channel attack can be bounded by (σ2n)
−d, with d the
number of shares and σ2n the noise affecting the leakage of each share, if σ
2
n ≥ d
(where the d factor is due to the computation of the partial products in the mul-
tiplication algorithm of [?]). In a recent work, Batistello et al. [?] showed that
since each share in a serial implementation is manipulated d times, it is possible
to pre-process their leakages by averaging. This reduces their noise variance by
an additional factor d, meaning that the noise condition becomes σ2n ≥ d2 over-
all [?]. Interestingly, while such a pre-processing is also possible in our parallel
case, due to the identical grey cycles of Figure 4, the number of times each sum
of shares is manipulated is now bounded to 2 (independent of d) which miti-
gates the impact of such attacks. That is, we can maintain the noise condition
for secure masking at σ2n ≥ 2d (where the factor 2 comes from the repetition of
the grey cycles), even when exploiting the averaging pre-processing.
7 Case studies
By Theorem 1, security in the bounded moment model of a parallel implemen-
tation can be established from security of its serialization in the probing model.
Therefore, it is possible to use existing formal methods to test the security of
parallel implementations, by first pre-processing them into a serial ones, and
feeding the resulting serial programs into a verification tool. In this section, we
report on the successful automated analysis of several parallel implementations,
including the parallel refreshing and multiplication presented in the previous
section, and serial composition of parallel S-boxes. Note that, due to the algo-
rithmic complexity of the verification task, we only establish security at small
orders. However, we also note that, although our main design constraint was for
our algorithms to be easily implementable in parallel, the use of automated tools
– as opposed to manual analyses – to verify their security has yielded algorithms
that match or improve on the state-of-the-art in their randomness requirements
at these orders. All experiments reported in this section are based on the current
version of the tool of [?]. This version supports automated verification of two
properties: the usual notion of probing security, and a strictly stronger notion,
recently introduced in [?] under the name strong non-interference (SNI), which
is better suited to the compositional verification of large circuits.
7.1 Parallel refreshing
We first consider the parallel refreshing algorithm from the previous section.
Theorem 2 (Security of Algorithm 1). The refreshing in Algorithm 1 is
secure at order d− 1 in the bounded moment model for all d ≤ 7.
By Theorem 1, it is sufficient to prove (d− 1)-probing security to get security at
order d − 1 in the bounded moment model. We do so using the tool by Barthe
et al. [?] for each order d ≤ 7. Table 1 shows the verification time for each proof.
In addition, we consider the problem of how to construct a SNI mask refresh-
ing gadget that behaves as well with respect to our parallel computation model.
We rely on the current version of the tool from Barthe et al. [?], which supports
the verification of strong non-interference properties. Table 2 reports the verifica-
tion results for some number of mask refreshing algorithms, constructed simply
d (d− 1)-b.m. time (s)
3 3 1
4 3 1
5 3 2
6 3 20
7 3 420
Table 1. Probing and bounded moment security of Algorithm 1.
by iterating Algorithm 1 (denoted Rd). We denote with R
n
d the algorithm that
iterates Rd n times. Table 2 also shows the randomness requirements both for
our algorithm and for the only other known SNI mask refreshing gadget, based
on Ishai, Sahai and Wagner’s multiplication algorithm [?].
# rand. bits
Alg. d (d− 1)-SNI our alg. [?] time (s)
Rd 3 3 3 3 1
Rd 4 3 4 6 1
Rd 5 7 5 10 1
R2d 5 3 10 10 1
R2d 6 3 12 15 1
R2d 7 3 14 21 1
R2d 8 7 16 28 1
R3d 8 3 24 28 4
R3d 9 3 27 36 36
R3d 10 3 30 45 288
R4d 11 3 40 55 3045
Table 2. SNI secure variants of Algorithm 1.
These experiments show that, for small masking orders, there exist regular
mask refreshing gadgets that are easily parallelizable, suitable for the construc-
tion of secure circuits by composition, and that have small randomness require-
ments. This fact is particularly useful when viewed through the lens of Theo-
rem 1. Indeed, SNI gadgets are instrumental in easily proving probing security
for large circuits [?], which Theorem 1 then lifts to the bounded moment model
and parallel implementations. We conjecture that iterating the simple mask re-
freshing gadget from Algorithm 1 d(d− 1)/3e times always yields a (d− 1)-SNI
mask refreshing algorithm over d shares. The resulting algorithm is easily paral-
lelizable and requires d(d− 1)/3e · d bits of randomness (marginally improving
on the d · (d − 1)/2 bits of randomness from the ISW-based mask refreshing).
We leave a proof of strong non-interference for all d’s as future work.
7.2 Parallel multiplication
We now consider the parallel multiplication algorithm from the previous section
(Algorithm 3), and prove its security for small orders.
Theorem 3 (Security of Algorithm 3). The multiplication in Algorithm 3
is secure at order d− 1 in the bounded moment model for all d ≤ 7.
By Theorem 1, it is sufficient to prove (d− 1)-probing security to get security at
order d − 1 in the bounded moment model. We do so using the tool by Barthe
et al. [?] for each d ≤ 7. Table 3 shows the verification time for each instance.
# rand. bits
d (d− 1)-b.m. our alg. [?] time (s)
3 3 3 2 1
4 3 4 4 1
5 3 5 5 2
6 3 12 11 17
7 3 14 15 480
Table 3. Probing and bounded moment security of Algorithm 3.
We also show a comparison of the randomness requirement of our algorithm
and those of Beläıd et al. [?]. Note that we sometimes need one additional ran-
dom bit compared to the algorithm of Beläıd et al. [?]. This is due to our par-
allelization constraint: instead of sampling uniform sharings of 0, we only allow
ourselves to sample uniformly random vectors and to rotate them.
As before, we now investigate some combinations of Algorithms 1 and 3 in
the hope of identifying regular and easily parallelizable SNI multiplication al-
gorithms. The results of the experiments are shown in Table 4, where d is
Algorithm 3, specialized to d shares. In addition to showing whether or not the
algorithm considered is SNI, the table shows verification times and compares the
randomness requirements of our algorithm with that of the multiplication algo-
rithm by Ishai, Sahai and Wagner, which is the best known SNI multiplication
algorithm in terms of randomness. As with the original tool by Barthe et al. [?],
the verification task is constrained to security orders o ≤ 8 for circuits involving
single multiplications due to the exponential nature of the problem it tackles.
We conjecture that the combination of our multiplication algorithm with a single
#rand. bits
Algorithm d (d− 1)-SNI our alg. [?] time (s)
d 3 3 3 3 1
d d ≥ 4 7 d(d− 1)/4 d(d− 1)/2 -
Rd ◦ d 4 3 8 6 1
Rd ◦ d 5 3 10 10 1
Rd ◦ d 6 3 18 15 39
Rd ◦ d 7 3 21 21 2647
Rd ◦ d 8 3 24 28 176400
Table 4. SNI security for variants of Algorithm 3.
refreshing is SNI for any d. This is intuitively justified by the fact our multiplica-
tion algorithm includes a number of “half refreshings”, which must be combined
with a final refreshing for the d’s such that the it ends with an accumulation
step. We leave the proof of this conjecture as an interesting open problem.
7.3 S-boxes and Feistel networks
In order to better investigate the effects on the security of larger circuits of
reducing the randomness requirements of the multiplication and refreshing algo-
rithms, we now consider small S-boxes, shown in Figure 5, and their iterations.
Figure 5(a) describes a simple 3-bit S-box similar to the “Class 13” S-box of
(a) 3-bit S-box (sbox3) (b) 4-bit S-box (sbox4)
Fig. 5. Examples of elementary circuits.
Ullrich et al. [?]. Figure 5(b) describes a 4-bit S-box constructed by applying
a Feistel construction to a 2-bit function. Table 5 shows verification results for
iterations of these circuits for several small orders, exhibiting some interesting
compositional properties for these orders. sbox3 denotes the circuit from Fig-
ure 5(a), sbox4 denotes the circuit from Figure 5(b), and sboxr4 denotes the
circuit from Figure 5(b), modified so that the upper output of its inner trans-
formation is refreshed. As before, integer exponents denote sequential iteration.
We note that, although there is no evidence that iterating sbox4 longer yields
d = 3
Algorithm 2-b.m. time (s)
sbox3 3 1
sbox23 3 1
sbox4 3 1
sbox24 3 1
sbox34 3 714
sboxr34 3 1
sboxr44 3 3
sboxr54 3 7
sboxr64 3 12
d = 4
Algorithm 3-b.m. time (s)
sbox3 3 13
sbox23 3 322
sbox4 3 2
sbox24 3 67
Table 5. Probing and bounded moment security of small S-boxes.
insecure circuits, obtaining convincing security results for more than 3 iterations
using automated tools seems unfeasible without relying on compositional princi-
ples. In particular, inserting a single mask refreshing operation per Feistel round
greatly speeds up the verification of large iterations of the 4-bit S-box from Fig-
ure 5(b). This highlights possible interactions between tools oriented towards the
verification of small optimized circuits for particular values of d [?,?,?] and tools
geared towards the more efficient but less precise verification of large circuits [?].
The ability to make our algorithms SNI allows us to directly take advantage of
this “randomness complexity vs. verification time” tradeoff.
8 Separation results
The previous sections illustrated that the reduction from security in the bounded
moment model for parallel implementations to security in the probing model for
their corresponding serialized implementations gives solutions to a number of
technical challenges in the design of secure masking schemes. We now ques-
tion whether the weaker condition required for security in the bounded moment
model allows some implementations to be secure in this model and not in the
probing model. We answer this question positively, starting with somewhat spe-
cialized but illustrative examples, and then putting forward a practically relevant
separation between these models in the context of continuous leakages.
8.1 Specialized encodings and masking schemes
Starting example. Let us imagine a 2-cycle parallel implementation manipu-
lating two shares in each cycle. In the first cycle, the same random bit r is loaded
twice, giving rise to a state (r, r). In the second cycle, a shared sensitive value
a is loaded twice, giving rise to a state (a ⊕ r, a ⊕ r). Clearly, in the probing
model two probes (on r and a⊕ r) are sufficient to learn a. But for an adversary
observing the abstract leakages of this parallel implementations (i.e. the arith-
metic sum for each cycle), and for a particular type of leakage function such that
αji = 1 and G
j
i = Id in Equation (2), the first cycle will only reveal r + r while
the second cycle will reveal a constant 1. So no combinations of these leakages
can be used to recover a. An even simpler example would be the parallel manip-
ulation of a and a which trivially does not leak any information if their values
are just summed. Such implementations are known under the name “dual-rail
pre-charged” implementations in the literature [?]. Their main problem is that
they require much stronger physical assumptions than masked implementations.
That is, the leakages on the shares a and a do not only need to be independent
but identical, which turns our to be much harder to achieve in practice [?].
Leakage squeezing and low entropy masking schemes. Interestingly, the
literature provides additional examples of countermeasures where the security
order is larger in the bounded moment model than in the probing model. In
particular, leakage squeezing and low entropy masking schemes exploit special
types of encodings such that the lowest key-dependent statistical moment of
their leakage distrubutions is larger than the number of shares, if the leakage
function’s deterministic part is linear [?,?], i.e. if Gji = Id in Equation (2). Note
that this requirement should not be confused with the global linearity require-
ment of Equation (2). That is, what masking generally requires to be secure
is that the different shares are combined linearly (i.e. that Equation (2) is a
first-degree polynomial of the Gji (Yi(j))’s). Leakage squeezing and low entropy
masking schemes additionally require that the (local) Gji functions are linear.
The previous examples show that in theory, there exist leakage functions
such that the security order in the bounded moment model is higher than the
security order in the probing model, which is sufficient to prove separation.
Yet, as previously mentioned, in practice the identical (resp. linear) leakage
assumption required for dual-rail pre-charged implementations (resp. leakage
squeezing and low entropy masking schemes) is extremely hard to fulfill (resp.
has not been thoroughly studied yet). So this is not a general separation for any
implementation. We next present such a more general separation.
8.2 The continuous leakage separation
A continuous probing attack against the refreshing of Algorithm 1.
Up to this point of the paper, our analyses have considered “one-shot” attacks
and security. Yet, in practice, the most realistic leakage models consider adver-
saries who can continuously observe several executions of the target algorithms.
Indeed, this typically corresponds to the standard DPA setting where senstive in-
formation is extracted by combining observations from many successive runs [?].
Such a setting is reflected in the continuous t-probing model of Ishai, Sahai and
Wagner [?], where the adversary can learn t intermediate values produced during
the computation of each execution of the algorithm. It implies that over time
the adversary may learn much more information than just the t values – and in
particular more than d, the number of shares. To be concrete, in a continuous
attack that runs for q executions the adversary can learn up to tq intermediate
values, evenly distributed between the executions of the algorithm.
Designing strong mask refreshing schemes that achieve security in the con-
tinuous t-probing model is a non-trivial task. In this section, we show that Algo-
rithm 1 can be broken for any number of shares d, if the refreshing is repeated
consecutively for d times and in each execution the adversary can learn up to
3 intermediate values. To explain the attack, we first generalize this algorithm
to d executions, with a
(0)
1 , . . . , a
(0)
d the initial encoding of some secret bit a, as
given in Algorithm 2. The Lemma below gives the attack. Similar attacks are
used in [?] for the inner product masking in the bounded leakage model.
Lemma 2. Let a be a uniformly chosen secret bit, d ∈ N a number of shares
and consider Algorithm 2. In each iteration of the for loop there exists a set of
3 probes such that after d iterations the secret a can be learned.
Proof. We show that, if the adversary can probe 3 intermediate values in each
iteration of the parallel refreshing for d iterations, then he can recover the secret
Algorithm 2 d-times execution of the parallel refreshing algorithm.
Input: Shares a(0) satisfying
⊕
i a
(0)
i = a and
d random vectors r(i).
Output: Refreshed shares a(d) satisfying
⊕
i a
(d)
i = a.
for i = 1 to d do
a(i) = a(i−1) ⊕ r(i) ⊕ rot(r(i), 1);
end for
return a(d).
bit a. The proof is by induction, where we show that, after learning the values of
his 3 probes in the ith iteration, the adversary knows the sum of the first i shares
of a, that is Ai1 :=
⊕i
j=1 a
(i)
j . Since A
d
1 :=
⊕d
j=1 a
(d)
j = a, after d iterations, the
adversary thus knows the value of a. In the first iteration, a single probe on
share a
(1)
1 is sufficient to learn A
1
1 := a
(1)
1 . We now prove the inductive step. Let
1 < ` ≤ d. Suppose after the (`−1)th execution, we know: A`−11 :=
⊕`−1
j=1 a
(`−1)
j .
In the `th iteration, the adversary probes r
(`)
d , r
(`)
`−1 and a
(`)
` , allowing him to
compute A`1 using the following equalities:
A`1 =
⊕̀
j=1
a
(`)
j = a
(`)
` ⊕
`−1⊕
j=1
a
(`)
j = a
(`)
` ⊕
`−1⊕
j=1
a
(`−1)
j ⊕ r
(`)
j ⊕ r
(`)
j−1
= a
(`)
` ⊕ r
(`)
d ⊕ r
(`)
`−1 ⊕
`−1⊕
j=1
a
(`−1)
j = a
(`)
` ⊕ r
(`)
d ⊕ r
(`)
`−1 ⊕A
`−1
1 ,
where we use the convention that for any j we have r
(j))
0 = r
(j))
d . Since all values
after the last equality either are known from the previous round or have been
learned in the current round the above concludes the proof. ut
Continuous security of Algorithm 1 in the bounded moment model.
The previous attack crucially relies on the fact that the adversary can move
his probes adaptively between different iterations, i.e. in the ith execution he
must learn different values than in the (i− 1)th execution. This implies that in
practice he would need to exploit jointly ≈ 3d different time samples from the
power trace. We now show that such an attack is not possible in the (continuous)
bounded moment model. The only difference between the continuous bounded
moment model and the one-shot bounded moment model is that the first offers
more choice for combining leakages as there are q-times more cycles. More pre-
cisely, the natural extension of bounded moment security towards a continuous
setting requires that the expectation of any oth-degree polynomial of leakage
samples among the q leakage vectors that can be observed by the adversary is
independent of any sensitive variable Y ∈ {0, 1} that is produced during the q
executions of the implementation. Thanks to Lemma 1, we know that a suffi-
cient condition for this condition to hold is that is that the expectation of all the
monomials is independent of Y . So concretely, we only need that for any tuple
of o possible clock cycles c1, c2 . . . , co ∈ [1, qN ], we have:
Pr[Y = 0] = Pr[Y = 0|E[Lc1 × Lc2 × . . .× Lco ]],
Pr[Y = 1] = Pr[Y = 1|E[Lc1 × Lc2 × . . .× Lco ]].
In the one-shot bounded moment model c1, c2 . . . , co would only run in [1, N ].
Our following separation result additionally needs a specialization to stateless
primitives. By stateless, we mean primitives such as block ciphers that only need
to maintain a constant secret key in memory from one execution to the other.
Theorem 4. The implementation of a stateless primitive where the secret key
is refreshed using Algorithm 1 is secure at order o in the continuous bounded
moment model if it is secure at order o in the one-shot probing model.
Proof (sketch). We consider an algorithm for which a single execution takes N
cycles which is repeated q times. We can view the q-times execution of the al-
gorithm as a computation running for qN cycles. Since we are only interested
in protecting stateless primitives, individual executions are only connected via
their refreshed key. Hence, the q-times execution of the N -cycle implementation
can be viewed as a circuit consisting of q refreshings of the secret key using
Algorithm 1, where each refreshed key is used as input for the stateless masked
implementation. If we show that this “inflated” circuit is secure against an ad-
versary placing up to o probes in these qN cycles (in total and not per execution
as in the continuous probing model), the result follows by Theorem 1.
For this purpose, we first observee that o probes just in the part belonging to
the q-times refreshing do not allow the adversary to learn the masked secret key.
This follows from the fact that probing o values in a one-shot execution of the
refreshing (Algorithm 1) does not allow the adversary to learn this masked secret
key. More precisely, any such probes in the refreshing can be directly translated
into probes on the initial encoding (and giving the appropriate randomness of the
refreshing to the adversary for free). This means that any probe in the refreshing
part allows to learn at most a single share of the masked secret key going into
the stateless masked implementation. Moreover, we know by assumption that a
single-shot execution of the implementation is o-probing secure. This implies that
even after o probes inside the masked implementation there still must exist one
share of the masked state of which these probes are independent. More generally,
placing o− i probes in the masked implementation must imply that these probes
are independent of at least i + 1 shares of the masked state, since otherwise
the remaining i probes can be placed at the unknown input shares to get a
correlation with the masked secret key. As a result, we can also reveal all of the
shares of the input encoding except for these i+ 1 shares that are independent.
Therefore, by simply adding up the probes, we get that even placing o probes
inside of the inflated circuit maintains security. ut
Note that the above argument with the inflated circuit and the special use
of the refreshing fails to work when we consider stateful primitives. In such a
setting, the refreshing may interact with other parts of the circuit. Hence, we
would need a stronger (composable) refreshing to achieve security in this case,
in order to deal with the fact that Algorithm 1 could then appear at arbitrary
positions in the computation. As already mentioned, the security condition of
the bounded moment model is significantly weaker than in the probing model,
which is what allows us to reach this positive result. Intuitively, security in the
probing model requires that, given a certain number of probes, no information is
leaked. By contrast, security in the bounded moment model only requires that
this information is hard to exploit, which is captured by the fact that the lowest
informative statistical moment in the leakage distribution observed by the adver-
sary is bounded. This model nicely captures the reality of concrete side-channel
attacks, where all the points of a leakage traces (as in Figure 1) are available to
this adversary, and we want to ensure that he will at least have to estimate a
higher-order moment of this leakage distribution in order to extract sensitive in-
formation (a task that is exponentially hard in o if the distribution is sufficiently
noisy). We believe this last result is particularly relevant for cryptographic en-
gineers, since it clarifies a long standing gap between the theory and practice of
masking schemes regarding the need of complex refreshing schemes. Namely, we
are able to show that simple refreshing schemes such as in Section 6.1 indeed
bring sufficient security against concrete higher-order side-channel attacks.
Note also that it is an interesting open problem to investigate the security of
our simple refreshing scheme in the continuous noisy leakage model. Intuitively,
extending the attack of Lemma 2 to this setting seems difficult. Take the second
step for example: we have learned A11 and want to learn A
2
1 with three noisy
probes. If the noise is such that we do not learn A21 exactly, then observing
again threee probes with an independent noise will not help much (since we
cannot easily combine the information on the fresh A21, and would need to collect
information on all d shares to accumulate information on the constant secret).
As for Theorem 1 in Section 5, we can anyway note that the bounded moment
model allows obtaining much easier connections to the (more theoretical) probing
model than the (more general but more involved) noisy leakage model.
9 Independence issues
Before concluding, we discuss one important advantage of threshold implemen-
tation for hardware (parallel) implementations, namely their better resistance
against glitches. We take advantage of and generalize this discussion to clarify
the different independence issues that can affect leaking implementations, and
detail how they can be addressed in order to obtain actual implementations that
deliver the security levels guaranteed by masking security proofs.
Implementation defaults. As a starting point, we reproduce a standard ex-
ample of threshold implementation, in Figure 6(a), which corresponds to the
secure execution of a small Boolean function f(x), where both the function
(a) Threshold implementation. (b) 3-bit partial product.
Fig. 6. Independence issues and threshold implementations.
and the inputs/outputs are shared in three pieces. In this figure, the (light and
dark) gray rectangles correspond to registers, and the blue circles correspond to
combinatorial circuits. From this example, we can list three different types of
non-independence issues that can occur in practice:
1. Computational re-combining (or glitches). In this first case, transient inter-
mediate computations are such that the combinatorial part of the circuit
re-combines the shares. This effect has been frequently observed in the liter-
ature under the name “glitches”, and has been exploited to break (i.e. reduce
the security order) of many hardware implementations (e.g. [?]).
2. Memory re-combining (or transitions). In this second case, non independence
comes from register re-use and the fact that actual leakage may be propor-
tional to the transition between the register states. For example, this would
happen in Figure 6(a), if registers x1 and y1 (which depends on x2, x3) are
the same. This effect has been frequently observed in the literature too, un-
der the name “distance-based” or “transition-based” leakages, and has been
exploited to break software implementations (e.g. [?,?]).
3. Routing re-combining (or coupling). In this final case, the re-combining is
based on the physical proximity of the wires. The leakage function would
then be proportional to some function of these wires. Such effects, known
under the name “coupling”, could break the additive model of Equation (2)
in case of complex (e.g. quadratic) function. To the best of our knowledge,
they have not yet been exploited in a concrete (published) attack.
Glitches, threshold implementations and non-completeness. One impor-
tant contribution of threshold implementations is to introduce a sound algorith-
mic way to deal with glitches. For this purpose, they require their implemen-
tations to satisfy the “non-completeness” property, which requires (at order o)
that any combination of up to o component functions fi must be independent
of at least one input share [?]. Interestingly, and as depicted in Figure 6(b), this
property is inherently satisfied by our parallel multiplication algorithm, which is
in line with the previous observations in [?] and the standard method to synthe-
size threshold implementations, which is based on a decomposition in quadratic
functions [?]. Note that threshold implementations crucially rely on the separa-
tion of the non-complete fi functions by registers. So in order to obtain both
efficient and glitch-free implementations of Algorithm 3, it is typically advisable
to implement it in larger fields (e.g. by extending our multiplication algorithm
in GF(28) as for the AES) or to exploit parallelism via bitslicing [?].
Transition-based leakage. Various design solutions exist for this purpose. The
straighforward one is simply to ensure that all the registers in the implementation
are different, or to double the order of the masking scheme [?]. But this is of
course suboptimal (since not all transitions are leaking sensitive information).
So a better solution is to include transition-based leakages in the evaluation of
masked implementations, a task which also benefits from the tools in [?].
Couplings. This last effect being essentially physical, there are no algorith-
mic/software methods to prevent it. Couplings are especially critical in the con-
text of parallel implementation since the non-linearity they imply may break
the the independent leakage assumption. (By contrast, in serial implementa-
tions this assumption is rather fulfilled by manipulating the shares at different
cycles). So the fact that routing-based recombinations do not occur in parallel
masked implementations is essentially an assumption that all designers have to
make. In this respect, we note that experimental results of attacks against thresh-
old implementations where several shares are manipulated in parallel (e.g. the
ones listed in Section 4.1) suggest that this assumption is indeed well respected
for current technologies. Yet, we also note that the risk of couplings increases
with technology scaling [?]. Hence, in the latter case it is anyway a good design
strategy to manipulate shares in larger fields, or to ensure a sufficient physical
distance between them if masking is implemented in a bitslice fashion.
10 Conclusions and open problems
Parallel masked implementations are appealing in practice, since they mitigate
the large cycle counts of masked software implementations. This paper introduces
sound tools for reasoning about such parallel implementations and their security
against side-channel attacks, and show how these tools can be used to recycle in
a hardware setting the large amount of theoretical and practical work done in
the context of software-oriented masking. Moreover, the paper shows that our
model supports secure and efficient refreshing and multiplication algorithms.
These results lead to two important tracks for further research.
First, the bounded moment model that we introduce can be seen as an in-
termediate path between the conceptually simple probing model and the prac-
tically relevant noisy leakage model. As discussed in Section 8 (and illustrated
in Figure 7), the bounded moment leakage model is strictly weaker than the
probing model. Hence, it would be interesting to investigate whether bounded
moment security implies noisy leakage security for certain classes of leakage func-
tions. Clearly, this cannot hold in general since there exist different distributions
with identical moments. Yet, and in view of the efficiency gains provided by
moment-based security evaluations, it is an interesting open problem to identify
the contexts in which this approach is sufficient, i.e. to find out when a leak-
age distribution is well enough represented by its moments. Building on and
formalizing the results in [?] is an interesting direction for this purpose.
Fig. 7. Reductions between leakage security models.
Second, whenever discovering a bias in a masked implementation, our tools
not only output the computation leading to this bias, but also its (possibly
small) amplitude. Hence, the bounded moment model has great potential to
extend the quantitative analysis in [?] (so far limited to first-order leakages) to
the higher-order case. Relying on the fact that the biases may be quantitatively
hard to exploit could lead to further reductions of the randomness requirements
in masked implementations, e.g. by combining the evaluation of these biases with
tools to analyze non-independent leakages introduced in [?] (Section 4.2).
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Algorithm 3 Parallel multiplication algorithm.
Input: Shares a and b satisfying
⊕
i ai = a and
⊕
i bi = b,
and
⌈
d−1
4
⌉
uniformly random vectors ri.
Output: Shares x satisfying
⊕
i ai = a · b.
c1 = a · b;
for i = 1 to
⌊
d−[(d−3) mod 4]
2
⌋
do
c2i = a · rot(b, i);
c2i+1 = rot(a, i) · b;
end for
if d mod 4 = 0 then
cd = a · rot(b, d/2);
end if
if d mod 4 = 1 then
cd−1 = a · rot(b,
⌊
d
2
⌋
);
cd = rot(a,
⌊
d
2
⌋
) · b;
end if
if d mod 4 = 2 then
cd−2 = a · rot(b,
⌊
d
2
⌋
);
cd−1 = rot(a,
⌊
d
2
⌋
) · b;
cd = a · rot(b,
⌊
d
2
⌋
+ 1);
end if
d1 = c1 ⊕ r1;
for i = 1 to
⌊
d−[(d−3) mod 4]
2
⌋
do
d3i−1 = d3i−2 ⊕ c2i;
d3i = d3i−1 ⊕ c2i+1;
d3i+1 = d3i ⊕ rot(rd(i+1)/2e, i mod 2);
end for
if d mod 4 = 3 then
x = d3b d2 c+1
end if
if d mod 4 = 0 then
x = d
3b d−12 c+1 ⊕ cd;
end if
if d mod 4 = 1 then
x = d
3b d−22 c+1 ⊕ cd−1 ⊕ cd;
end if
if d mod 4 = 2 then
x = d
3b d−32 c+1 ⊕ cd−2 ⊕ cd−1 ⊕ rot(rd d−14 e, 1)⊕ cd;
end if
return x.
